good findNigerian population ~ 190mil
were gunna need a bigger boat.
Not even that is necessary.All we'd need to do is change the pow.
Anyone could find out in a couple of minutes using bitnodes.21.co which hosters are preferred by big blockers (if there is any skew)When Blockstream come under more pressure I expect DDOS attacks to start again so it might be wise to answer me in a private message so you don't reveal in public a popular hoster among big block proponents.
a pow change would be an effective option but it feels a bit like using a nuke on a bees nest.All we'd need to do is change the pow. Everyone and their grandma would spin up their computer for the chance to make free money and the cost of mining would quickly rise back up to meet the price of bitcoin, while the attacker and his massive investment are left out to dry. The network would return to confirming transactions. It would be a very stupid attack.
Not even that is necessary.Not even that is necessary.
My favorite method for making a fork bidirectionally incompatible is to simply swap the order of any two fields in the block header to make Core reject the blocks. You can keep using the same miners and same proof of work and still have incompatible chains that can't reorg each other.
odd they haven't figured out this isn't really possible.Chinese officials are considering policies including restricting domestic bitcoin exchanges from moving the cryptocurrency to platforms outside the nation and imposing quotas on the amount of bitcoins that can be sent abroad
John Stewart (real name of Leibowitz) has a brother named Larry, who just happens to be (perhaps former) CEO of the NY Stock Exchange.Some more interesting neo-left SJW-relevant trivia for you, it turns out also that Anthony Weiner is a close personal friend of Jon Stewart going back to their college days.
Wait until the news breaks that the Clinton Foundation being a front for a money laundering & influence pedaling network was actually just a cover for it being a front for a global pedophile network.You just can't make this stuff up, people
i also find it odd that after banning bitcoin a bunch of times,odd they haven't figured out this isn't really possible.
its an all or nothing kinda thing when it comes to "limiting BTC TX" its not like there is a country code inside bitcoin addresses.
Since the end of September the yuan’s decline reversed. The impending U.S. interest-rate hike was delayed to December."Bitcoin has surged 21% since the end of September as the yuan’s declines accelerated, boosting speculation Chinese investors were buying the cryptocurrency as a hedge against further weakness. With the risk of quicker depreciation rising along with the odds of an impending U.S. interest-rate hike,
What is bitcoin intraday trading?"In intraday trading, bitcoin erased a gain of as much of 2.6% overnight"
The problem with malicious soft forks (a.k.a. "51% attacks") is the way that the honest members of the network are automatically "swept along" with them. You say that "there is nothing stopping the other <= 49% from forking off of the attackers chain" and that's true ... except for the coordination cost of organizing such a fork which is going to be non-trivial. The easiest and most powerful way to neutralize a 51% attack is to change the PoW, thereby making the attacker's hardware useless. You're suggesting that the honest members of the network might also be able to neutralize the attack without changing the PoW by "tightening the rules." I'm not sure that's really true though. I think there's a reason that Bitcoin's security model is generally understood to be premised on a majority of the hash power remaining "honest." If there were additional consensus rules we could use to prevent even a mining majority from acting maliciously, presumably we would have already added them, no? My intuition is that the best we could hope for (in a scenario where we're assuming no PoW change and a determined attacker) would be a constant cat-and-mouse game where the honest members of the network would have to keep repeatedly forking to negate every new attack.instead let me go on a rant about why a minner with >51% is NOT a problem at all.
so what's the problem, with 51% anyway?
one might says: " the miner can do all kinds of nasty things, including block anyone else from minning blocks by orphaning their blocks"
I'll say :" thats only true if you subscribe to the idea that the longest chain, is the valid chain, NO MATTER WHAT.... there is Nothing stopping the other <=49% from forking off of the attackers chain. all that needs to be done as a defence for a 51% attack is to tighten the rules of a valid block, and make it such that even if someone has >51% all they can do is produce valid blocks! rules like reject the block if it does nothing for clearing the unconfirmed TX mem pool, or all TX must be valid with valid sigs ( oh wait thats already a rule -_-). there you go, every time a >51% attacker attacks, the other 49% of network collectively say "That's not a valid block!" the attacker ends up on a worthless fork created by his stupidity, and an honest miner finds a block which is acceptable to everyone else, life goes on uninterrupted."
a thought exercise to the reader, read the above and try to poke a hole in the logic. what kind of >51% attack can't we simply "rule out"?
it would be automatic, the block does not fallow the very strict set of rules? it gets orphaned right away! even if majority hashing power is backing it...cost of organizing such a fork which is going to be non-trivial.
i dont think so.If there were additional consensus rules we could use to prevent even a mining majority from acting maliciously, presumably we would have already added them, no?