Intuitively I'm not buying the fluffypony presentation.
I know the small block crowd reads this thread, so let me begin be saying that I thought his presentation was very well done. His slides were effective, he articulated his ideas clearly, and the presentation had a nice flow to it. I still disagreed with most of it
The impression I got was the fluffypony thought that "ideal" scaling would be to dynamically increase or decrease the size of blocks such that CONOP was held constant. If you know feedback control, you could imagine a circuit like this
(if the set point > measurement, the block size is increased; if the set point is less than the measurement, the block size is decreased):
Now let's completely ignore the problem
@albin addressed of how one would actually measure CONOP in the first place. Let's assume for the moment that we
can measure it accurately. Would we actually want the system to behave like this?
The big problem I would have is that it requires a magic number in order to run: namely the "CONOP target" that we're using as the feedback controller's set point.
We could say: "Well, just target whatever the CONOP happens to be
today and then it's not a magic number!" OK sort of, but we have no evidence to believe that the value that CONOP happens to be today is somehow ideal. Sure it works right now, but maybe it won't work at all in the future.
For example, the CONOP of today permits Raspberry-pi's on slow internet connections to "keep up." If we target today's CONOP going forward, then we're implicitly saying that we want the equivalent of tomorrow's Raspberry-Pis to also be able to keep up. Is that really practical for something that could become a new global monetary system?
I think we need a lot more evidence that miner attacks to intentionally inflate the block size are actually a threat in the real world, and in the presentation I feel like these issues are addressed too cavalierly, rapidly jumping around and conflating completely different attack scenarios.
Me too. I wish they would at least try to estimate the cost of these attacks and describe the models they are using. I feel that if they actually took the time to associate reasonable numbers with all the "attacks" they imagine, that they'd see most of them are pretty weak.