@Roger_Murdock Great post! It really lays out clearly the mechanics around soft and hard forks.
In the context of of a 1MB block size limit, if one doesn't want such a limit, it makes no sense to enforce this rule. And for a business serving its clients, it should be prepared to accept bigger blocks if miners start producing them, whether or not it strongly favors them. It is their responsibility to serve the interests of their clients. So if there is a reasonable chance that miners might start producing bigger blocks, it is incumbent on these businesses to be prepared for that.
Yes! This point is so important. Enforcing validity rules, other than most proof-of-work, is what causes chain splits. So if a majority of the network decides to loosen enforcement of validity rules (aka "hard fork"), and a chain split results, then the split is the responsibility of those who choose to continue enforcing the validity rule. They may have a good and valid reason to do so, so it is not necessarily a bad thing. But that reason has to be weighed against the huge cost in lost network effect of splitting from the majority.So the idea that "hard forks risk chain splits" seems misguided -- and indeed essentially backwards. Chain splits are always ultimately caused by the willingness of some individuals to either begin enforcing, or continue enforcing, a "validity" rule
In the context of of a 1MB block size limit, if one doesn't want such a limit, it makes no sense to enforce this rule. And for a business serving its clients, it should be prepared to accept bigger blocks if miners start producing them, whether or not it strongly favors them. It is their responsibility to serve the interests of their clients. So if there is a reasonable chance that miners might start producing bigger blocks, it is incumbent on these businesses to be prepared for that.
The only thing I would add here is that one could do a similar thing, but in the hopes that the majority hash power would capitulate to your desired validity rule. You would essentially "call their bluff" in the hopes that they would capitulate. So you night not actually need to force a chain split, merely create the risk of one, to rein in the errant miners. To make this effective, one would need to clearly communicate the rule, and convincingly signal your commitment to enforce it. This is risky, however, so should only be done for validity rules that add value to the network. This is the process I attempt to describe in more detail in my recent Medium article.Forcing a market referendum when the hash power majority is dangerously wrong
In rare cases, you may also choose to enforce a validity rule even when you're confident that doing so puts you in the current hash power minority.