Its slated for .12.x. inca is writing a BUIP so we can formally chuck it.
Here is my thought process. All fees incentivize hashing. And all hashing contributes to security. Because the level of security is really just the cost of a 51% attack, no? Now you might think, well, to the extent that hashing power spent producing orphaned blocks "could have" been spent creating un-orphaned blocks, orphaning is associated with a reduction in difficulty. And lower difficulty means that it would be less expensive to acquire the necessary hardware for a 51% attack, no? (The attacker can make his attack blocks lean and mean so that they're not subject to the same orphan risk as honest miners. Or to think about it another way, when a good chunk of the network's hashing power is "diverted" to orphaned blocks, an attacker would seem to need less than 51% of the network's total hashing power for an attack.) But making small blocks when there are lots of fee-paying transactions to be had (the whole reason that other miners are bearing the risk of orphaning and making larger blocks) is itself a kind of cost. Furthermore, honest miners would have an easier time responding to a lean-block 51% attack by themselves making smaller blocks to counter it. (They essentially have extra hash power in reserve that they could draw on.) So no, I don't see how orphaning risk reduces PoW security in any real meaningful way.A few of us are trying to sort out a technical point in this convo:
Those companies should choose you. I would vote for you.I am withholding my formal candidacy in the hopes that someone who has more experience with Bitcoin and more importantly is paid full time wants to run. An engineer sponsored by some Bitcoin company (or group of companies) would be a good choice.
I will have something in the next day or so.Its slated for .12.x. inca is writing a BUIP so we can formally chuck it.
if i only understood Spanish@cypherdoc
Here is a great analysis by Adriano Celentano about the situation. He totally agrees with you, and not just since yesterday. Listen carefully:
And all those changes are essentially the only work they have done on bitcoin over the past year or so. There has been not only zero work done on real scaling solutions, but active rejection of others' proposals to start work on scaling solutions.in this Joseph Poon post from 2mo ago, you see that all these changes being slipped into the code, like OP_CLTV, nSequence, RBF are all meant to make LN work more smoothly. it appears that those listed are partial fixes rammed in when SW would definitively fix malleability with one fell swoop. but that doesn't stop core devs from inserting them anyways just in case they can't get SW. so how much more complexity creep do these additions create?:
The correct behavior according to satoshi's design is for all nodes to reject double spend transactions and refuse to relay them or mine on them. This is the only way to protect the "instant payment" part of the design. RBF is an attack on that design.
Too bad there is large consensus among users and companies against that "scaling" plan. And that was with thermos' help.And Peter Todd falls in line and 100% consensus in Core devs?
i totally agree with this sentiment but that brings up a technical question for @theZerg .The correct behavior according to satoshi's design is for all nodes to reject double spend transactions and refuse to relay them or mine on them. This is the only way to protect the "instant payment" part of the design. RBF is an attack on that design.
It feels to me that enabling RBF in any form is incorrect and that it should not even be an option.