@Justus Ranvier, interesting article.
Seems to me the dynamic described unfolds within a larger context of the economics of violence. Specifically the balance between the cost of aggression versus the cost of defense. The development of technologies that change this balance create a shifting battle field in the struggle between centralized power structures and those seeking autonomy.
For example, the rise of the Internet makes it very inexpensive to build new channels of communication, and the proliferation of channels would take huge resources to monitor and control. Traditional media was expensive to set up, and was relatively easy to channel though gatekeeper control.
Similarly, the rise of knowledge workers makes it easier for individuals to work independently, without channeling their pay through one entity where it can be taxed at source. This makes tax enforcement more costly, and avoidance easier. The ability to work remotely in foreign jurisdictions tilts the balance even further.
Industrial era capital resources tend to be large and fixed in place, which makes it difficult to avoid control. Governments or Unions can hold the assets hostage to extort tribute to pay for their power structure. Companies whose assets are based on intellectual resources and services can more nimbly route around controls. For example, Netflix is able to avoid the burdensome regulatory oversight of regulators (so far). AirBnb, Uber, and Open Bazaar, are other examples.
Of course, Bitcoin also falls within this category, perhaps one of the most powerful technologies so far to shift power away from aggressive control.
I've basically summarized the thesis of the book "The Sovereign Individual".
One way it relates to the Trump phenomenon is that as power shifts from centralized states more towards the individual, we can expect more inequality within states, and less inequality between states. This is because the highly skilled can keep more of the product of their labor, without it being subject to forcible redistribution. This benefits the skilled in poor countries (like programmers in India), and hurts the lower-skilled in rich countries (such as unionized factory workers). As a result, the book predicts a rise of nationalistic sentiment as the lower-skilled masses see they are losing out to foreign competition.
So according this analysis, nationalism is not the end game, but merely a side effect. The end game is a rebalancing of sovereignty to individuals, small geopolitical entities (eg. Singapore), and voluntary groups that may be local or geographically dispersed.
