@Justus Ranvier
Yeah, that's exactly how I think about a PoW-changing fork. I was also thinking it might be useful to sort of "map out" all the possible paths by which we could conceivably achieve our goal of larger blocks. (It probably presents better as some kind of flow diagram, but I'm graphically-challenged.)
You can try to fork with a majority of the hash power on board or without a majority of the hash power on board.
If you're forking without a majority of the hash power on board, you can try to fork with a minority of the hash power using the existing PoW algorithm, or you can use a fork that changes the PoW algorithm.
Obviously, the ideal scenario would be a non-PoW-changing fork that has (i.e., starts out with) a majority of the hash power on board -- because that provides the strongest Schelling point for investors and thus gives your fork the best chance of success.
But obviously as we've seen, getting the support of a majority of hash power is difficult. Ok, but how
could it be done?
Well, "we" (preferably referring here to a well-organized, well-funded group of stakeholders) could bring new fork-supporting hash power online (i.e. newly manufactured mining hardware) and/or "convert" the existing hash power.
How could you convert the existing hash power?
You can
buy the hardware outright from existing miners and then use it to support a fork, and/or convince existing miners to switch which implementation they're running.
How could you convince existing miners to switch implementations? You can do one or more of the following: "bribe" them, "threaten" them, and/or try to convince them switching is already in their best interests.
"Bribes" could take the form of either the proverbial briefcases full of bitcoin offered to targeted pool operators (a little unsavory perhaps, but desperate times) or, more-transparently, a
"forking bounty".
The "threat" I envision would be the threat that, if the miners don't allow meaningful on-chain scaling in a timely manner, we (and again, referring here to a well-funded / organized group of stakeholders) will throw our collective economic weight behind a PoW-changing fork, thereby threatening to significantly undermine the value of miners' hardware investment.
Finally, we could appeal to their reason by seeking to understand and effectively address their specific concerns, e.g., explaining why "hard forks" aren't dangerous, the principles behind BU's emergent consensus, why on-chain scaling actually
promotes "decentralization," demonstrating that there now exists viable / competent / well-funded alternatives to the Core team (BU's recently received donation is really helpful in that regard). I think a well-organized face-to-face scaling conference with the major miners would be helpful here.
