Not in all layers 2 you lose control of your funds.I would do it like ChangeTip do it today.
1. The user send bitcoin to the layer 2 system's bitcoin address and loose the direct control over the funds. (A ChangeTip address, a two way pegged sidechain address, opening a lightning payment channel.)
Again, while in both cases you have to do settling on the blockchain at the end, the difference lies in how you perform offchain transactions, with full trust of another party, or not.2. The user use that other system to perform transactions. (Give tips, send sidecoins, perform a lightning transaction.)
3. Settle back to bitcoin from the other system (if needed).
Yes, Shapeshift and services like coinbase do it all day along, but you have to trust them, even if for just an instant.The conversion from layer one to layer two (and back) is trivial, as bitcoin is programmable money. ShapeShift do this all day long, and you don't have to trust them very much because they hold your cash for a split second. And the day they start to steal, nobody will use them anymore.
The point is exactly the opposite, you just have to do your homeworksYou have to trust that second layer, just like you trust the bitcoin layer. That's the point.
I haven't seen any, that's why I wrote a big "if".Has there been any progress towards a workable implementation of this?
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There is no concept. Rootstock tries with merged mining, but that is inferior secure, like onenames drop of namecoin demonstrated. There have been times when f2pool had 75% of the hashing power of namecoin. Not a good base for trusting sidechains."*IF* bitcoin has a way to send its coins offchain and then get them back..." -- @Dusty
It's been a year and a half since the sidechain white paper that, in Appendix B, discussed the feasibility of efficient SPV proofs to move sidechain coins back to the main chain. Has there been any progress towards a workable implementation of this? I'm beginning to wonder if non-federated sidechains are actually possible.
Please wake me up.Up to 29 soft-fork features deployable in parallel. Now we just need more developers to implement more!
That's not how it (should) work.[...]
Say you wanted to bet on tomorrow's weather in London in Paul Sztorc's Hivemind prediction market. You lock 1 BTC to produce 1 hivecoin and place your bet. You win the bet and now have 2 hivecoins. You want to cash in your winnings in BTC. How do you get 2 BTC back? I guess you still have the 1 hivecoin that can unlock your original 1 BTC, plus you have someone else's 1 hivecoin that they at some point locked 1 BTC to obtain, so you can use those to unlock that guy's original 1 BTC to send to yourself and now you have 2 BTC.
[...]
You are right, I had a rough day and I was not polite, please forgive meAnd please don't tell me to do my homework anymore. No hard feelings
Yes of course, and the bitcoin system is designed in such a way that you don't need to trust a third party, you trust the majority of the network where there is not a direct link from the miners to the users. That's a very, very different model of working.@Dusty
With all due respect, I don't think you understand what I'm saying.
First of all. Do you agree that you have to trust the bitcoin system to use it?
A client that is bootstrapping his node find the peers in some way and does not need to trust any of them because of the proof of work. He trusts the PoW and not the peers.If your answer to this question is "No, I don't have to. Bitcoin is a trustless system.", I don't think I can make you understand my point.
Of course I trust the math that is behind his inner workings.I would never use bitcoin personally if I didn't trust in it to some degree.
No.If you want to use bitcoin (an IOU of bitcoin) in another transaction system, you have to submit the direct control of your bitcoins to that system. Let's call it System B. It doesn't matter if System B is centralized or distributed. It doesn't matter if it's ChangeTip, an alt coin via ShapeShift, a sidechain or lightning network. You do not control the private bitcoin key of your bitcoins anymore.
LN transactions are not normal bitcoin transactions, as they don't happen on the blockchain. They are just transactions on a separate network (with bitcoin IOUs). Except off course the on- and offramp, opening/closing of channel, settlement or whatever you want to call it.In fact, LN transactions are just normal bitcoin transactions, the only difference is that you produce (potentially) thousands of them but you broadcast only the last one of them on the bitcoin blockchain, the settling one.
I know, it's maybe unfair and prejudicing, but I can't help myself to think that this becomes a big gate for trojan horses. Just put 29 softforks at the same time, propagate crazy ideas about everything, and wait untill the miners implement something they don't understand.I'm not a software development professional, but even I know that trying to jam in a bunch of features at once is not what you're supposed to do!