Bitcoin Unlimited - Ideas, arguments, and proposals

[Zangelbert Bingledack]

Thanks @Peter R, I have some ideas for polishing up the Preamble and Article 1, though to make it really sing it might have to be a fairly deep rewrite just because I'd have to do an "original seeing" on the vision of the document (and with the loose end regarding unlimited vs. user-chosen limit there is perhaps still some small ambiguity in the vision, which makes it harder to write forcefully; also I don't feel like I have a complete grasp on what the tone considerations are - like what kind of overall orientation and what kind of phrasing would be harped on by the small blockists or Blockstream - to put BU in the most favorable and most bullet-proof possible light).

The catch is I'm quite busy at the moment and not sure when I'd have a concentrated block of time to work on it. I'll certainly post something if inspiration+time strikes.

 

[Peter R]

@Zangelbert Bingledack

Yes, I was imagining a fairly deep rewrite to allow you to make the whole thing more cohesive and elegant in its vision.

But please don't feel obligated to work on it! I just threw it out there because I'm a fan of your writing

 

[Zangelbert Bingledack]

@Peter R

Good to hear

Note my edit as well (I'm a compulsive re-editor).

 

[theZerg]

@peter_r WRT balance of power, also notice that:
1. the developer holds the DNS names -- so presumably if the secretary starts censoring the developer can drop the hammer (redirect the DNS to a new site).
2. the Developer cannot block an accepted, coded BUIP for more than a month or two because the community can vote to commit it "AS IS" (presumably some other engineer has fully tested the patch or the community would not make that vote).
3. There is a formal way for members to open a topic and insist on a vote in a timely fashion. This is what we never got WRT the block size.
4. There's a no-confidence vote that can kick someone out. Presumably if the booted party takes the keys with him/her we'll sue.

I don't think that it will attract a lot of eyes next week. That will probably happen when we have made a few releases.

If I don't mention your change below, I pulled it in verbatim:

p1, par3:
How about "We recognize the importance of the mining industry and the necessity to increase transaction revenue to support its growth as the block subsidy decreases."

p1, par 5: "moral and socially accepted" should be toned down a bit IMO

To what do you think?

p1, par 5: "position of determination" --> "position of influence"?

Hmm... really a biased judge is welcome to write op-eds or shout from the rooftops so long as s/he is not making decisions about the case. So once you recuse yourself, you are basically saying "I'm partial and I'm going to try to influence this decision". What's another word that could be used?

Art 1-II: the formatting of the quote looks funny.

What's funny about it? Do you think it should be a span not a block quote?


Art 1-III: "Bitcoin Unlimited nodes can accept a chain with an excessive block, when needed, in order to track consensus." -> Will this be true for the first release? Rocks and Cypher wanted to avoid this for now; however, I do like having it in this document.

I think its ok. You are reading the term "excessive block" as I defined it (bigger then some configured value). But it works just as well in the context of this article to mean "a bigger block than traditional rules would allow"

Art 2-IV: 2 weeks doesn't seem like enough time to me.

Yes I struggled with this a bit. I don't want stuff to be delayed if the Developer is against the majority WRT a fix. Finally I decided that this is good. Notice that the Developer can ask the Proposer for an extension... Ofc, if the Proposer forces the vote by saying "no let's vote", then the Developer can add a note to the BUIP saying "I cannot support this because I haven't had time to think about it yet, so vote no", and the members can vote it down for that reason alone.

So its better to think of it like the Developer, etc is guaranteed two weeks without any formal discussion (the fact that the BUIP was submitted is public knowledge ofc so informal discussion can occur). Then the proposal is placed with the relevant officers' opinions attached for public discussion for another 2 weeks. So its a total of 4 weeks from proposal to vote.

Art 2-V: (testing)

Absolutely, a developer would have to be an idiot if he did not insist on testing... I don't want this document to tell the developer (or pool op, secretary or president for that matter) how to do his job. If needed, we can always write a BUIP detailing that.

But anyway I changed it to:

If a BUIP contains a patch, the Developer may review the patch for acceptability (including but not limited to bugs, tests, coding standards) AFTER BUIP acceptance.

 

[Peter R]

Mike is more aligned with our vision for BU than I realized. Below are some select quotes from his recent AMA.

He supports in industry alliance that includes a mining initiative:

At this point I think the best way for Bitcoin to survive and remain viable is if an industry alliance formed to get rid of Bitcoin Core. That alliance would have to include miners.

He agrees that the evolution of the network should be governed by the code we freely choose to run:

The only decision making process that should really matter is end users and miners picking what software to run.

He thinks 0-conf transactions and SPV wallets are useful:

Core has...turned their back on unconfirmed transactions [and] on SPV wallets

He believes we need a formalized decision-making process (such as Article II from @theZerg's Constitution):

...get out of this notion that a vaguely defined community of experts hands decisions down from on high after a bunch of conferences or an IRC meeting or whatever...here are [my suggestions]:

• For Core: replacing decision making through unanimity with a formal process for expressing and resolving disagreement, in a company this is usually a CEO, in a committee it can be a vote.
• Ensuring that for any decision that is made, the wider world has a clear and simple process for rejecting it. Any group must be able to be given "no" for an answer. In a country this is usually an election or a market. Gavin, myself and many others think a market for nodes which may cast different votes on changes to the block chain is the right way to do this.
• De-emphasising the role of (often self-proclaimed) intellectuals and experts, thus emphasising the judgement of work by results rather than the reputation of who was involved. Deference to expertise is a means to an end with the end being correct results, but in the Bitcoin community it's too often become the end itself.

 

[theZerg]

That is great to see!

 

[awemany]

As I tried to say before:

I'd like to see the special interests come to the surface. We'll form a special interest group that thinks and argues that we best represent the interest of the Bitcoin system by growing it.

Blockstream will be one party representing fancy stuff (and to some extend their interest to be a mandatory gatekeeper) on top of the chain.

Then there's the old Bitcoin foundation. A whole bunch of organizations might form to further Bitcoin and/or profit for it - and all hopefully openly arguing for their special interest.

I am optimistic BU will get the attention and have the mindshare with a lot of Bitcoin early adopters and generally wise people. Mike Hearn is definitely in that group - although I am certainly watchful regarding his (perceived?) attitude towards privacy.

That said, I sometimes wonder whether we should call ourselves Bitcoin Original in addition to Bitcoin Unlimited...
[doublepost=1446975262][/doublepost]From Mike Hearn's AMA on bitcoin.com:

I'm not sure I ever mentioned this before, but a long time ago I studied psychology for a couple of years and got a qualification in it (a UK specific thing, not a degree). One of the topics we studied was group psychology. If you read the wikipedia page on groupthink, I think the first couple of paragraphs describe what's happened to Bitcoin Core quite clearly: a desire for harmony through unanimous consensus leading to irrational and dysfunctional decision making.

Fully agreed. @theZerg's foundation process means that BU can live with a high level of disagreement and still be functional - and I consider this to be a good thing, for encouraging creativity while still eventually reaching a common goal (through accepted/non-accepted BUIPs).

 

[Zangelbert Bingledack]

It's true that Core and BS attract a lot of "joiners" (those vulnerable to the social pressure and facile rhetoric of perceived authority figures, like most of the true believers that show up in every reddit thread on these issues, who seem pathologically unable to think for themselves) whereas those for bigger blocks not so much, excepting those people who just love Gavin.

 

[Peter R]

Poking the bear regarding Bitcoin Unlimited:

http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-November/011759.html

 

[Peter R]

OK, I'm leaving the bear cave now. I had quite a lengthy debate with Greg that I believe reveals more into the mind of Core Dev. If you click "next message" after following the above link then you can read through the entire conversation, if anyone is interested.

 

[Zangelbert Bingledack]

@Peter R

Very interesting. Gmax wrote:

"Spends a coin that was already spent" "provides a signature that doesn't verify with the pubkey" "creates bitcoins out of thin air" -- these are not logically different than "if size>x return false".

"Not logically different" seems to be a gesture toward option (a) in Forkology 101 (or (b)). These all break away from the consensus ("set in stone by Satoshi and defended by us"), so they are logically of the same class in some sense. But of course the market doesn't care about that.

He then labels the entirety of option (c) as "politics," making the classic error of thinking that emergent market order is some kind of politics. Politics usually refers to central control schemes (top down), which is exactly what he is attempting to engage in (option (b)). Market control is an elimination of politics.

He is a technocrat politician trying to claim that pointing out that his group has power is "politics," much like someone using wordplay to make a specious argument will accuse anyone who calls out the wordplay as "arguing semantics."

XT is seen as a coup, of course, because he can only see it as a bid to take the power position Core has, rather than a process of removing power positions (and politics) from Bitcoin develop entirely. He hasn't yet been able to imagine governance without government - the governance of the market without the government of Core.

This is more or less the pattern of Core referenced here:


Here it was convenient for his argument to momentarily vacillate over to (a) so that he could claim "logic" was on his side, before returning to (b).

Note: Despite my observations above, I think any claim of "politics" should be ignored or sidestepped completely, as a tactical point, because no conversation about politics or even what constitutes politics is going to lead anywhere in such a thorny debate. It will just be used to kick up dust and obscure any useful points. Instead I'd say it is a simple matter of what investors support. No matter what he says is valid or logically equivalent, the market of investors can take all the value from the ledger maintained by such a chain, rendering all that pontification moot.

 

[Peter R]

Interesting, it looks like Greg unsubscribed from the developer mailing list right after our debate last night:

[doublepost=1447613547][/doublepost]Jorge Timon (blue) and me (black) on whether accepting a 1.1 MB block full of valid TXs is "technically different" than accepting a TX that creates coins out of thin air (Jorge sides with Greg):

[doublepost=1447613664][/doublepost]@Zangelbert Bingledack: Jorge's view on forkology (blue) and my response (black):

 

[Zangelbert Bingledack]

@Peter R

Bang, bang. Nice.

For me the essential point was this:

Jorge Timon: What about property enforcement? If the invisible hand of the market is what decides consensus rules instead of their (still incomple) specification (aka libconsensus), then the market could decide to stop enforcing ownership.

Peter R: Correct. Bitcoin is an experiment and could still fail (e.g., the network could allow people to move coins without valid signatures). For Bitcoin to be viable, the network of miners and node operators being net-econo-rational actually is probably a core axiom that must be accepted.

The assumption that they're econo-rational (profit maximizing) is what underpins Tier 1 control by investors ("expression of investor intent"). It follows as a direct consequence of investor intent being known, that an econo-rational actor will - ceteris paribus - set blocksize caps and other parameters in mining/node operation that aim toward a result that conforms to investor wishes.

Ignoring the technical difficulties in communication and price dynamics, if a miner magically knows for instance that the BTC price will rest near $500 if a change is instituted by a certain date and $100 if it is not, ceteris paribus the miners and nodes will make every effort to instigate, condone, and enforce that change. In short, they will strive to see that the change investors want is effected, and this is nearly axiomatic to the extent investor will can be communicated credibly.

So my answer to the question,

What logical/technical difference is there between the rule that impedes me from creating transactions bigger than X and the rules that prevent me from creating new coins?

is that it's the wrong question. The right question is, "How do investors holding BTC and trading on the BTC price - and hence economically rational miners working for 25BTC block rewards - value the adherence to these rules differently?"

Then the answer is crystal clear.

(Though it's more complex to explain due to the messiness of the existence of non-mining nodes, node operators are also generally highly affected by the BTC price, whether they are holders, businesses operating in BTC that do more business if the price is higher and therefore more stable (and certainly do less business in the extreme opposite case) and who must keep some BTC float, or just parties interested in seeing Bitcoin succeed (who also must care about the price).)

 

[Peter R]

Word that Gmax quite the Bitcoin Dev Mailing List after our debate last night is spreading:

https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/3sx9k7/mikecoin_fans_succeed_in_chasing_gmaxwell_away/

 

[solex]

Congratulations to Peter R for winning these exchanges and getting the small-blockists on the run.

Jorge Timon is a hard-bitten 1MBer and I would expect him to argue that black is white if it fit with that aim.

I don't have sympathy for Greg because I am still pissed off with him because of the block-limit debate throughout 2013-14 when gave the illusion of neutrality. He engaged in many threads, but all along kept quiet about his plan to let the limit get maxed out with all the attendant risks for Bitcoin's network effect and ecosystem growth. When he finally had to engage on his own delta UTXO flex-cap idea, he blanked Gavin rather than work constructively.

ZB's psychological strategy makes sense, but there is no room for magnanimity yet while the number of BIP101 blocks is <1%

 

[theZerg]

That was a very interesting discussion. Let's think about a client that did not understand the new locktime op code.

Now someone sends you money with a locktime op code. The client looks back and sees an understandable history, a wierd op, then more understandable history, then txn to you. A meta-cognitive client might recognize how unlikely it is that the unknown op is a clawback that will somehow steal back these coins (because then why did others accept them as payment and bc such an opcode would go against basic bitcoin design). It might alert the user to the wierd history but STILL TRACK LONGEST CHAIN CONSENSUS.
[doublepost=1447631954][/doublepost]This idea is completely antithetical to the current philosophy. For example, I accidentally put a mistake in a debug log (forgot an arg). The client decided that the DB was corrupted bc it got an exception during load and deleted 4.5 years of testnet history.
[doublepost=1447632111][/doublepost]This fragility is dangerous. What if I could craft a block that triggered this behavior? I could not only take out the node but wipe the blockchain as well.

 

[VeritasSapere]

Hello everyone, where would I find the latest version of the Articles of Confederation? I might be able to contribute to it, I have a background in political philosophy so I might be able to help. I support what you are doing here, I think it is great.

 

[Peter R]

@VeritasSapere: thank you for joining us! I have always been impressed by your energy at arguing for bigger blocks at bitcointalk.org.

The most recent version of the "Articles of Confederation" are on the BU draft website:

http://www.bitcoinunlimited.info/articlesOfFederation

I am sure @theZerg and others will be delighted to learn that you're interested in helping to refine this document.

You should also considering joining as a member in this thread:

https://bitco.in/forum/threads/bitcoin-unlimited-membership-join-us.208/

 

[theZerg]

yes have at it. You can post here if you need to understand the purpose behind some of the rules...

 

[VeritasSapere]

Thank you, you have made me feel welcome. I will do so, I will most likely focus on articulating basic principles. I will take my time better understanding what is here.