Gold collapsing. Bitcoin UP.

freetrader

Moderator
Staff member
Dec 16, 2015
2,806
6,088
Mining isn't even supposed to make a profit - they should be glad they have any.
Spoken like a true POS* developer and BS** co-founder.

So, what are you all here planning to do to to celebrate when there is the first >1MB block (the first parthenogenesis block) good and well in the chain?

Shall we make bets on what the page count in this thread will be at that time?

I knew they were wrong when they said the revolution would not be televised.
It will be streamed!

* Proof-of-stake
** Blockstream
 
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AdrianX

Well-Known Member
Aug 28, 2015
2,097
5,797
bitco.in
OMFG! lol!
"expect maybe poeple who pay them"
What happened I've been paying attention but...but,

developers have no duty to anyone, except perhaps people who pay them to do stuff.
that's 100% true developers are not part of the bitcoin incentive system.

Mining isn't even supposed to make a profit - they should be glad they have any.
mining is going to be very competitive yes they are going to have a tough time but why do it if there is no profit? - and those developers - Miners are your customers they run your code - they keep the incentives aligned for profit of all things. OMFG whats happening to bitcoin.

Luke being the most honest of everyone, as crazy as he is, I like him the most, for just that one trait.
 

jbreher

Active Member
Dec 31, 2015
166
526
I think it's just a silly political statement that they will go down with the ship in case of an upgrade. But who knows...
In a way it makes sense. I don't know how many times that I've recently explained on BCT.org that the most-widely-discussed plan is to flip the switch and start making larger blocks at 75% for a diff period plus a diff period - but it is non-binding. It makes folk nervous. It may be worth discussing whether advertising those parms until 75% is hit. Not necessarily advocating the discussion, just relaying some feedback.
 

molecular

Active Member
Aug 31, 2015
372
1,391
@molecular

Yeah it is a total trap and an incoherent contract as there isn't even a way to tie blocks to a specific repository. Note how Bitclub signalled BU and Segwit today. Bitfinex is going to have to radically revise or annul the whole thing. Scroll up for more comments on it.
Thanks for the hint to "scroll up". This thread is getting some good old volume back, it seems, so it was too much to read through.

I'm not going to buy those BCU tokens because of the very real risk that there will be a bigblock fork either sometime after 12/31 or "mined with a differnt client" than BU. Too much headroom to wiggle for bitfinex come settlement time.

The sad thing: this skews the results heavily towards BCC and you can bet your ass those valuations will be used to argue "economic majority wants core".

Screw bitfinex for releasing such badly defined tokens. I'm almost ready to attribute malice, because in general those guys aren't that stupid / careless.

My excitement when I saw they were doing something this tells me one thing, though: it's a very good idea in general and there's probably loads of demand. It just needs to be done right. Maybe these guys should discuss publicly before releasing such nonsense next time.
 

Zarathustra

Well-Known Member
Aug 28, 2015
1,439
3,797
It seems to me the way to do fork futures is simply to sell tokens that are redeemable for 1 BTC in a given side of a fork if that fork takes place. Steps:

0. The miners running BU or other EC implementations, or who are just ready to fork to bigger blocks, reach a supermajority, likely 75% of the hashpower or more.

1. The supermajority of miners communicate that they are planning to publish a 2MB block (for example) on a certain flag day to activate a hard fork (BU/Classic are merely tools the miners could use to make this happen)

2. Exchanges offer one-meg chain tokens (OMCTs) and two-meg chain tokens (TMCTs), redeemable after the flag day.

3. You deposit 1 BTC into the exchange's fork futures market.

4. You're credited with 1 OMCT and 1 TMCT (representing that fact upon such a fork, the 1 BTC you held would have become 1 BTC in each of the two chains).

5. You can offer to sell your OMCT for whatever price you want in TMCTs, and vice versa. Like you could offer 1 OMCT for 0.5 TMCT. If someone took the offer, you would have no OMCT and 1.5 TMCT.

6a. If the miners go through with the fork and the chain containing the 2MB block wins, you are credited with 1.5 BTC, a 50% profit.

6b. If miners go through with the fork and the 2MB chain loses, you lose your investment (since you sold all your 1MB chain tokens).

6c. If miners go through with the fork and it results in, say, a 10/90 split in favor of the 2MB chain, you are credited with 90% of 1.5 BTC, or 1.35 BTC, a 35% profit.

6d. If miners call off the fork, all trading is invalidated and your initial 1BTC deposit is returned (minus fees, presumably). This isn't a problem since no withdrawals were possible in the meantime anyway.

A few other cases: If you buy the extreme underdog, you stand to multiply your money several times over if it wins. If you buy the extremely dominant side, you stand to make only a few percent profit if it wins. If you don't trade at all, you will always break even in every scenario.

Note: The number of BTC going into the exchange will equal the number of BTC they have to pay out on either/both chain(s), so the exchange doesn't need to provide any additional liquidity.

This seems easy and fair. Most notably, BU and Core have nothing to do with it, other than being the tools that might be used to effect the fork (but who knows - miners staying on the 1MB chain might be running BU with EB1AD999999 for all anyone knows, and miners on the 2MB chain might be running Classic, BitcoinEC, or their own mod; clients and repos are simply irrelevant).
You think, the market should wait to offer a future contract until a supermajority of 75% signals being ready to fork to bigger blocks? I think we need that contract now. With 75%, it's game over already for Core.
[doublepost=1490081438][/doublepost]

His Name is not Meni Rosenfeld ...

https://www.reddit.com/r/btc/comments/60lpy7/hi_meni_rosenfeld_his_name_is_dr_liu_changyong/
 

Zarathustra

Well-Known Member
Aug 28, 2015
1,439
3,797
Hypocrisy in perfection: Nick Szabo, the non-inventor of Peer-to-peer-electronic-cash is still sticking and chatting with the North Coreans and accuses Jihan of talking 'like an old-style-communist'. And it's a lie. Jihan didn't say that the markets are unfair. He said the market will deliver better contracts than this one.

 
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Zangelbert Bingledack

Well-Known Member
Aug 29, 2015
1,485
5,585
The sad thing: this skews the results heavily towards BCC and you can bet your ass those valuations will be used to argue "economic majority wants core".
This is actually great in a way, because as soon as another exchange starts offering proper fork futures, a lot of people will mistakenly think the prices should match, and we who are in the know can take their money ruthlessly.

@_mr_e

How about this? I wrote a new draft of the Bitfinex fork futures terms. Now it just pays out coins on the 1MB chain and any >1MB chain (chain containing at least one >1MB block) that exists by year end.
Terms and Conditions for Chain Split Tokens

These terms and conditions (these “T+Cs”) govern your use and exchange of Chain Split Tokens (as defined below) on the Site. You should read these T+Cs carefully. The Site’s Terms of Service continue to apply to all Site users; these T+Cs are in addition to, and supplement, and not in substitution of, the Terms of Service. The Terms of Service are available here. By using any CSTs on the Site in any manner from time to time, you agree to these T+Cs and, for the avoidance of any doubt, to the Terms of Service.

These T+Cs may be amended, changed, or updated by Bitfinex at any time and without prior notice to you. You should check back often to confirm that your copy and understanding of these T+Cs is current and correct. Your non-termination or continued use of any Services after the effective date of any amendments, changes, or updates constitutes your acceptance of these Terms of Service, as modified by such amendments, changes, or updates.

The use of, ownership of, and trading in any Chain Split Token (as defined below) is void where prohibited by applicable law.

1. Definitions: In these T+Cs, the following words have the following meanings unless otherwise indicated:

1.1 “CST” means a Chain Split Token, which are Digital Tokens designed to facilitate trading on the value of incompatible ledger units associated with a potential, contingent, and non-guaranteed forking event on the Bitcoin blockchain;

1.2 “BCS” means a CST representing the greatest SHA256 proof-of-work chain from the Bitcoin genesis block that follows Bitcoin’s present-day blocksize limit rules;

1.3 “BCL” means a CST representing the greatest SHA256 proof-of-work chain from the Bitcoin genesis block that contains a block larger than 1MB in size;

1.4 “Bitcoin Smallblocks Token” means a Digital Token converted from BCSs at or after Contract Settlement, as set out in these T+Cs;

1.5 “Bitcoin Largeblocks Token” means a Digital Token converted from BCLs at or after Contract Settlement, as set out in these T+Cs;

1.6 the “Contract Period” starts on March 17, 2017 and ends at 11:59:59 pm UTC on December 31, 2017;

1.7 “Chain Split Event” means the moment a definite chain split due to a block being mined that is greater than 1MB in size, represented by the UTC date & time of the first block greater than 1MB in size;

1.10 “Contract Settlement” means the earlier of 11:59:59 pm UTC on December 31, 2017 or a Chain Split Event, as set out in these T+Cs; and,

1.11 “T+Cs” means these terms and conditions governing the use and exchange of CSTs on the Site.

Other terms not expressly defined in these T+Cs have the meanings set out in the Terms of Service.

2. Exchange & Trade: You may exchange bitcoins for BCSs and BCLs using the Site’s token manager platform until immediately before Contract Settlement. The rate available for exchange is 1 BCS + 1 BCL for each bitcoin. You may also redeem bitcoins using the Site’s token manager platform until immediately before Contract Settlement. The rate available for redemptions is 1 bitcoin for 1 BCS + 1 BCL. You may trade CSTs on the Site during the Contract Period in one market pair: BCS/BCL.

3. Settlement—Chain Split Event: At Chain Split Event, CSTs shall be converted on a 1:1 basis to Digital Tokens on their respective blockchains, as set out in these T+Cs.

4. Settlement—Expiration: In the event that no Chain Split Event occurs within the Contract Period, BCL will be redeemed at zero and BCS will be converted on a 1:1 basis to Bitcoin.

Important: Settlement of any Bitcoin Smallblocks Tokens or Bitcoin Largeblocks Tokens may be delayed in Bitfinex’s sole and absolute discretion. If the Bitcoin Smallblocks or Bitcoin Largeblocks blockchain is destroyed, reorganized, or experiences an unresolvable technical malfunction, in any manner and by any party or source, before settlements have been completed, such Bitcoin Smallblocks or Bitcoin Largeblocks tokens shall be deemed to have a value equal to zero and shall be confiscated and destroyed by Bitfinex.

5. No Representations & Warranties by Bitfinex: Bitfinex makes no representations, warranties, or guarantees to you of any kind. All CSTs, all software, and all blockchains are offered strictly on an as-is, where-is basis and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, are offered without any representation as to merchantability or fitness for any particular purpose.

6. Limitation of Liability & Release: Important: Bitfinex assumes no liability or responsibility for and shall have no liability or responsibility for any Losses directly or indirectly arising out of or related to your use of or trading in one or more CSTs and Bitcoin Smallblocks Tokens or Bitcoin Largeblocks Tokens and the use of any one or more blockchains, including but not limited to the Bitcoin Smallblocks blockchain or Bitcoin Largeblocks blockchain after Chain Split Event. You hereby agree to release the Associates from liability for any and all Losses, and you shall indemnify and save and hold the Associates harmless from and against all Losses. The foregoing limitations of liability shall apply whether the alleged liability or Losses are based on contract, negligence, tort, unjust enrichment, strict liability, or any other basis, even if the Associates have been advised of or should have known of the possibility of such losses and damages, and without regard to the success or effectiveness of any other remedies.

7. Post-Contract Settlement: After Contract Settlement, Bitfinex may or may not list Bitcoin Smallblocks Tokens or Bitcoin Largeblocks Tokens for trading, if they exist, on the Site, in its sole and absolute discretion.
 

Norway

Well-Known Member
Sep 29, 2015
2,424
6,410
In a way it makes sense. I don't know how many times that I've recently explained on BCT.org that the most-widely-discussed plan is to flip the switch and start making larger blocks at 75% for a diff period plus a diff period - but it is non-binding. It makes folk nervous. It may be worth discussing whether advertising those parms until 75% is hit. Not necessarily advocating the discussion, just relaying some feedback.
I was wrong, it wasn't just a silly political statement from BitClub. They are now signaling EC-parameters with 36P from a Core node with custom boinbase string.

And even better: The hardcore smallblock CEO, James Hilliard, has been instructed by the share holders of the company to switch all of it to BU in the near future!

EDIT: BitClub has 7,6% of the total hashpower!
 

Zangelbert Bingledack

Well-Known Member
Aug 29, 2015
1,485
5,585
You think, the market should wait to offer a future contract until a supermajority of 75% signals being ready to fork to bigger blocks? I think we need that contract now. With 75%, it's game over already for Core.
Well a fork futures contract is just buying tokens in either side of the fork. So there has to be a plan for a specific fork before there is anything to have futures contracts about.

In contrast, a general prediction market would allow for bets like, "By May 1, 2017, at least once 750 out of the 1000 blocks will signal for BU/Classic," but it would have to be on places like Fairlay rather than the exchanges, because it's more complicated than futures I think. And it wouldn't tell you anything about an actual fork, just who is signalling what.
 
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Norway

Well-Known Member
Sep 29, 2015
2,424
6,410
However, spreading is obviously not the same as contacting. So we don't know who contacted the exchanges. Only that Samson Mow probably knows.

It's all a bit water under the bridge at this point - exchanges are starting to prepare reasonable statements about their policies on the upcoming fork(s). It's looking better.
I wonder who Samsung Meeeow now work for after he quit BTCC. He is not listed as a Blockstream employee (yet?).

https://blockstream.com/team/
 

go1111111

Active Member
Alright folks, after much editing, I plan to post my Market Governance FAQ tomorrow to both subreddits, Medium, twitter, and do my best to spread it's message far and wide. However, I could use some help with one thing. I currently don't like the intro / answer to "Why does this FAQ exist?". I think it needs to grab the reader's attention more, since the FAQ is an 18 minute read.

Here is the old version of my answer:

"There are two main theories of how upgrades to Bitcoin should occur: Market Governance (sometimes called Market Consensus) and Near-Unanimous Social Consensus Governance.

Disagreements about Market Governance underlie most current debates in the Bitcoin community. Despite this, Market Governance is frequently misunderstood. This FAQ aims to correct that."

I think it's OK, but pretty utilitarian and doesn't really hook the reader. Here's a slightly modified version:

"Market Governance (sometimes called Market Consensus) is a theory about how upgrades to Bitcoin should occur.

Understanding Market Governance is critical to understanding both the block size debate, and debates about the appropriate use of hard forks.

Despite this, Market Governance is one of the least understood theories in Bitcoin, for at least two reasons:

  1. Fully understanding Market Governance requires a deep understanding of microeconomics.
  2. Proponents of Market Governance have rarely taken the time to explain the theory as a cohesive whole.
This FAQ is a first step toward addressing reason #2."

A little better. A couple things I prefer about this one: it stresses the importance of the theory more, it makes it seem difficult and thus perhaps interesting, it suggests that because cohesive explanations haven't been given often, what follows is rare and might be new to them. I still don't think it pops enough though.

Any ideas?
 

jake

New Member
Sep 26, 2016
10
72
A few random thoughts I've had this week.

1. Bitcoin Core will probably not come up with an official release that will support bigger blocks. The people with commit access are the hardliners and will go down with the ship. Instead I predict a social split within Bitcoin Core, between the fanatics and the pragmatics. The pragmatists want to work on Bitcoin and the fanatics think they are Bitcoin.

2. Something I thought of while talking with @Peter R a few days ago: A further incentive that will drive the thoroughly decisive resolution of a hard fork winner is that minority chain miners will find themselves facing a bit of a prisoner's dilemma. Not only would a pro-Core miner have to want to keep their chain alive, they would also need to consider the probability that no other minority chain miners will switch to the majority hashrate chain. If they base their calculations on keeping a 25% minority chain alive for 8 weeks until the difficulty readjustment, they would also need to assume that every other miner on this chain will be doing the same. If half the hashrate drops off, a determined ideological miner is now looking at 16 weeks until readjustment, while paying the same amount of money to keep their machines mining that they would pay regardless of which chain they mine. None of the pro-Core miners have 25%. BTCC and Slush are not hardliners and do not own their hashrate anyways, they have a responsibility to their customers to follow the more valuable chain.

3. Bitfinex BCU/BCC tokens: Their T&Cs are complete garbage, but I think at $200 the BCU tokens are incredibly undervalued. Several events could cause the price of the tokens to rise dramatically. Bitfinex could revise the T&Cs to be more clear/fair. BU support could (and probably will) surpass the 50% mark, making a fork appear all the more imminent. A more fair fork futures market could launch, and the pricing of these fair tokens could influence the price of the Bitfinex tokens. I think the likelihood of a fork before the end of the year is also very high. All that said, it's a very risky trade and a lot of it depends on Bitfinex management making sound decisions.
 

jake

New Member
Sep 26, 2016
10
72
My friend David had some great points about why adding replay protection is bad, so I asked him if he could write something a bit longer and if it would be ok if I posted it. So here it is:

In private discussions over the past few days, I've asked several Core developers to explain why weakening Bitcoin's consensus mechanism by adding replay protection is a good idea. Strangely, it didn't seem to have struck any of them that doing so is in any way problematic. But it is, and it is worrisome that none of them understood why.

Why is replay protection bad? The short answer is that it hurts us all by weakening bitcoin's consensus mechanism. The high cost of forking is part of this consensus mechanism. It is what preserves bitcoin's network effect and its value. And so we want it to be expensive for people to fork bitcoin, because the centralization of economic activity on the network is what makes bitcoin valuable and useful.

When I pushed Core developers to explain why they now believe forking should be easier, the only real attempt at an answer came from one developer who claimed that bitcoin has a moral obligation to protect "value" on minority chains. Except that it doesn't, because "value" doesn't exist in duplicate form on the network. Bitcoin guarantees users the ability to send their coins out into the network, but it only guarantees this once. And there are very good reasons for this.

The most important is that without replay protection, users have to CHOOSE whether they spend their coins on the majority fork (where the coins are more valuable) or the minority fork (where they are less valuable). The loss of wealth that comes from spending money on a minority fork is part of bitcoin's consensus pressure: it is what drives people to support the majority fork. So while people who want to support the minority chain are of course free to do so, the fact that they take an economic hit for doing so is useful: it is what drives the network to consensus on a majority chain in the first place.

In this sense, what is replay protection but insurance for losers? Letting users spend their coins twice undermines the influence of users have in determining for themselves which fork is really the proper consensus chain. And this is hardly the only perverse incentive replay protection creates. Consider Gresham's Law, for instance, the principle that "bad money drives out good money" (i.e. people hold valuable assets and dump low-value assets). In the cryptocurrency world, we saw this happen with the ETH/ETC fork when many users dumped coins on a fork they believed rapidly would lose value. A moment's reflection will show that this would not have happened without replay protection since it makes zero sense for anyone to spend a valuable coin in order to sell a less valuable one. But what distortionary pressures replay protection introduced! At a minimum, the trading activity that resulted from the frenzied dumping created an active market that incentivized miners, users and exchanges to support the minority chain and diluted consensus in the ETH community. Had the chain been left to fend for its own on the basis of actual usage it is much less likely the ETC fork would have succeeded: most exchanges would never have added it.

So what is the campaign to add replay protection to bitcoin? Considered politically, it seems to be an ill-considered attempt to make miners the only parties in the bitcoin ecosystem who run any real risks from a fork, and disempower users and exchanges by giving them incentives to vote for both rather than simply one fork. Replay protection gives exchanges a profitable road to support minority forks. It lets users gamble with "free money" and allows developers leech off bitcoin's network effect when forking. But this is far from costless behavior, as we all pay far higher costs in the long-term, not only through the erosion of the consensus pressures that encourage us to reach consensus, but also through the way easy forking makes important economic constraints like bitcoin's 21 million coin cap meaningless through the debasement of the currency and the dilution of the economic activity it supports.


David currently runs an awesome business in China called Wesecretary, and has been active in the bitcoin scene there for years. Wesecretary is a concierge service over WeChat that accepts Bitcoin. Rising fees and Circle dropping bitcoin as an option have caused his Bitcoin sales to drop off precipitously. Funny how almost anyone that actually uses bitcoin understands the damage being done by network congestion. I've invited him to this thread, hopefully he can join in discussion here.

edit: yes it should have read "replay" protection and not "relay." updated!
 
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