My apologies if this point rehashes something already well-discussed of which I'm unaware, but for a while now I've been occasionally introspecting on why selfish mining and Peter Todd's related block withholding type attacks rub me the wrong way intuitively, and perhaps why there is no evidence that they're actually even happening on the live network at all.
None of these ideas take any notion of time preference into account.
This entire class of attack vectors are variations on the idea that the attack is going to withhold (or interfere with) the ability of other mining nodes to receive their solved block information. The only reason this can be a theoretical concern is because of the existence of propagation delay (where the solver gets some amount of monopoly time working his own block). In the extreme theoretical case where all propagation delays are exactly 0, it's trivial to demonstrate that there is no long-term profitability in any of these strategies.
The claim is often made that these strategies are at best marginally effective, but within the assumptions of the threat model in which they're expressed, it's deductively provable that they have some profitability advantage statistically over sufficiently large sample sizes. This point has been made almost exactly over and over by Todd to justify concern.
The problem I want to throw out there is that this analysis is based on the assumption of equivalent preference between getting the mining reward now versus risking losing it for statistically marginally-higher revenues in the future. The inherent nature of time preference itself dictates that future revenues must be discounted in terms of current revenues, so if one is to make the claim that some toxic mining strategy results in say 3% additional revenue over a longer time horizon, it's entirely plausible that such a strategy actually operates at a loss.
There are lot of factors that we obviously know about that contribute today to influence the magnitude of that discount. For example, as long as technological progress is ASICs exists, we know that the revenue per unit time of any given capital expenditure is going to generally decay over time. Also there are risk/reward concerns inherent to not frontloading your revenues as much as possible, due to market and competitive uncertainties.
Even worse, this gets potentially orders of magnitude more complicated once we consider the possibility of financial hedging strategies from miners, such as entering into futures contracts. If a given miner operates at a certain amount of marginal profitability versus spot price, then there is a cost inherent to the risk of potentially having to buy at spot in order to settle.
I feel like there's a whole world of real economic considerations relating to time preference and risk aversion that might actually turn out to be way more involved than any of these theoretical attack scenarios being presented.