I believe the expression is : STILL GOT PAID
Luke-jr just did it for us. We couldn't ask for a better PR for BU. His hardfork BIP suggests to reduce the max blocksize to 300kb, and the grow so slow that we will get back to 1 MB in seven years.
On the one hand, by minimising the blocksize, BS Core remain steadfast in ensuring everyone with the least interest - anyone with even a Raspberry Pi - can play their part in safeguarding the Bitcoin network.Here's the smoking gun on Blockstream, from their own website, written by Hill himself:
https://www.reddit.com/r/btc/comments/5qefog/blockstream_business_plan_today_key_players_in/
The business plan of Liquid literally involves easing friction in getting a confirmation.
so.. what are BUs answers to those objections?
The first paragraph is taking the Emergent Consensus and trying to portray it as a problem which I don't think it is. It's true, under BU, if a majority of miners decide to go > 1MB, the minority have to pay serious attention. That's healthy for the network.If a minority of miners sets EB to one megabyte, and a majority of miners sets EB to, say, two megabytes, the network could split in two. As soon as anyone mines a two-megabyte block, a minority of miners will ignore it, and instead continue to extend the one-megabyte chain. The majority of miners, however, will accept the chain with the two-megabyte block, and extend that chain.
Different groups of miners would consider different chains valid, and mine on top of their “own” chain while ignoring the other chain. This split could technically last forever without the two chains ever converging, in effect splitting Bitcoin into two different networks and currencies.
BU is the Bitcoin implementation Satoshi describes in the White Paper. https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. it's worth making a copy of it because it's this exacts paragraph BS/Core fundamentalists were proposing to change.Satoshi - White Paper said:Nodes always consider the longest chain to be the correct one and will keep working on extending it. If two nodes broadcast different versions of the next block simultaneously, some nodes may receive one or the other first. In that case, they work on the first one they received, but save the other branch in case it becomes longer. The tie will be broken when the next proofof-work is found and one branch becomes longer; the nodes that were working on the other branch will then switch to the longer one.
Now Greg sees that as reason that these alerts need to be cryptographically secure and whatnot and that SPV should be able to somehow (and I fail to see where that is written anywhere in the whitepaper) notice a 51% attack on its own.As such, the verification is reliable as long as honest nodes control the network, but is more
vulnerable if the network is overpowered by an attacker. While network nodes can verify
transactions for themselves, the simplified method can be fooled by an attacker's fabricated
transactions for as long as the attacker can continue to overpower the network. One strategy to
protect against this would be to accept alerts from network nodes when they detect an invalid
block, prompting the user's software to download the full block and alerted transactions to
confirm the inconsistency. Businesses that receive frequent payments will probably still want to
run their own nodes for more independent security and quicker verification.
Don't make the mistake of assuming everything Greg says is false (any more than you should assume everything Gavin, etc. says is true).Now Greg sees that as reason that these alerts need to be cryptographically secure and whatnot and that SPV should be able to somehow (and I fail to see where that is written anywhere in the whitepaper) notice a 51% attack on its own.