There is an important thing I think our camp has been misunderstanding or conflating, and I have a sense that it is a key confusion in the year-long impasse.
Satoshi wrote about two
very different kinds of "voting" or "consensus" in the whitepaper:
- Nakamoto (chain-tip) consensus through PoW (consensus on a single chain; determines transaction ordering / the ledger state, given a certain set of block validity rules)
- Fork prediction market consensus (on protocol rules) through PoW (determines which set of block validity rules prevail in the event of controversy; now kind of busted or maybe even defunct due to mining specialization)
(Deleted most of the article to save space)
RE: Consensus Distinctions
This is a good insight. I like how it adds nuance and context to the discussion. More of that needs to be done all around probably.
RE: Prediction Markets
A prediction market might be an interesting idea. A fork-future could act as both an incentive and insurance policy for miners wanting mine a particular forked chain (i.e., miners can buy futures to hedge risk of some amount of loss should they end up on the wrong chain). The market itself would be a nice way to structure the interactions between the current set of market participants.
However, I'm not sure participating on a futures exchange - as a prediction market - is a reliable form of voting. I'm not sure what that means exactly, but its something to think about . . . I guess. Here's the tension I perceive: participation on a futures exchange would certainly communicate a measure of demand for X, but participation alone does not say who is sending the communication. That probably matters in some important way. As an example, think about these questions:
- How would a futures market prevent manipulation by short-term speculators (doesn't self-identify as a "bitcoiner") and anti-bitcoin interests?
- Does the presence of manipulation even matter? If so, how much?
You've really opened a complicated can of worms, Zingleback.
More [explicit] historical context is warranted. Clearly, the Bitcoin eco-system is different today than it was during Satoshi's time in a variety of ways. Consider:
- Satoshi started the project without the benefit of a certain market - there was literally no demand for bitcoins before Satoshi started sending out emails about a Bitcoin P2P ecash paper (and, ultimately the Bitcoin thread on the cryptography listserv was shutdown as being too political).
- The market that existed when Satoshi left the project was small in comparison to today's diverse, pretty-much-global market.
- With little-to-no-market for bitcoins, the decision to mine during Satoshi's era was based on a different set of factors than the factors used by today's miners (although there probably are some "timeless" factors).
- Decisions to attack the network during Satoshi's era were based on a different set of factors than the factors used by attackers today.
- Deciding and executing on certain network functionality, security, etc. matters during Satoshi's era carried less economic risk than they do today.
- There were far fewer ways to participate in Bitcoin AND crypto/digital/virtual currency during Satoshi's era.
- Choice in the digital currency ecosystem during Satoshi's era was practically bi-polar (Bitcoin vs. Not Bitcoin) whereas today choice is multi-polar.
I could see a prediction market both stoking and extinguishing embers in a variety "proxy-war" - like scenarios. Again, not sure if any of this matters either way, and how much if so.
I think Satoshi probably saw blocksize limit-type battles as inevitable clash-of-civilizations-like disputes. The analogy is kinda interesting because there really is no winner in a clash of civilizations - the clash is too gradual (if not glacial) and things just kinda are. One side is basically co-opted or bred out of existence over time, maybe unnoticeably.
Maybe
@jonny1000 has some wisdom with the win-big approach, especially when there's a movement for a fast consensus level change. Otherwise, prepare for the long-haul and/or try to become a Kore developer.
Consensus on how to get to consensus-level changes in the protocol should be a priority IMHO.