- Sep 29, 2015
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I wrote an article about this BUIP here:
https://www.yours.org/content/10-terabyte--is-it-too-big--06789e6775bd
I wrote an article about this BUIP here:
https://www.yours.org/content/10-terabyte--is-it-too-big--06789e6775bd
75% of the maintainers for ABC are BU members. BU is both a a organization, and an implementation.So no, Solex. On this specific topic I disagree with you. We should not subsidize the weaker software of ABC. We should not drag ourselves down to their amateur level.
That's just handwaving. Also, this is just flawed logic:Since this attack is unsustainable and will not cause much harm to the honeybadger, it will probably never even happen.
Simple example to point out the flawed logic: An attacker would've only needed to exploit the recent inflation bug in ABC / Core *once* to probably cause major market damage to the coins. And profit handsomely in the act. Just because something isn't sustained doesn't mean it can't be very harmful.A big block attack is not sustainable, so it's not harmful
The reason such attack would fail right now is because systems are running with reasonable upper limits and would reject such blocks. This BUIP is proposing to move away from a somewhat sensible default.Since the attack is not sustainable but very weak, it will probably never happen.
Can you demonstrate how to do that using BU? Dropping a connection that's receiving an attack block -- for which you don't know the final size ahead of time?Anyone being attacked by big blocks can just drop the connection to the attacker
Alright, I think I'm done here.People lining up to play blocksize police and spreading FUD about big blocks are the real problem.
A sensible developer-determined default, well above demand and also within current capacity, creates a Schelling point which is strong enough so a majority of miners are using it as a soft limit, thereby likely to orphan bloat blocks. This, while simultaneously weak enough of a Schelling point so miners (and users) can co-operate in shifting the limit higher to suit rising demand, i.e. in the scenario that the developers get co-opted by banksters, VCs, reptilians, or otherwise abrogate their responsibility about ensuring the default block limit is above demand for future releases.How do you prevent a bloat block attack with a default value that is configurable?
I think that's the "paternal approach" that @Norway, @shadders, me et al. want to get rid of:A sensible developer-determined default, well above demand and also within current capacity, creates a Schelling point which is strong enough so a majority of miners are using it as a soft limit, thereby likely to orphan bloat blocks. This, while simultaneously weak enough of a Schelling point so miners (and users) can co-operate in shifting the limit higher to suit rising demand, i.e. in the scenario that the developers get co-opted by banksters, VCs, reptilians, or otherwise abrogate their responsibility about ensuring the default block limit is above demand for future releases.
Isn't that exactly @Norway's goal? To force the ecosystem to find an emerging consensus without the help of the 'Politbüro'?I voted with NO, too.
Not because I am afraid of Monster-Blocks. But because deleting the limit - which this effecticely does - deletes Bitcoin Unlimited's core value: Enabling the ecosystem to find an emerging consensus about the blocksize limit.
Shouldn't we try to lead instead of always just follow?I will vote "no" for this because I think that if BU gains majority hash, that's when such a thing makes sense.